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2.1 Introduction
The first article of  this series focused on Dooyeweerd’s interpretation of  
Reason.1 I intend to draw on Dooyeweerd’s conception for the development of  
an exegetical methodology that does justice to the multiaspectual phenomena 
of  the text as well as to the chosen hermeneutical presuppositions. As 
mentioned earlier, Dooyeweerd’s conception must be critically reflected on if  
an unbiased application of  his thought is to be made. In order to allow for a 
critical analysis of  Dooyeweerd’s thought I choose the work of  the Christian 
philosopher Fernando Canale. Thus this article will present (for the first time) 
Canale’s analysis of  Reason. The third article of  this series will show how 
Canale’s and Dooyeweerd’s work can be utilized in order to investigate the 
ontological foundations of  specific methodologies. In the fourth and final 
article, I will critique Dooyeweerd’s and Canale’s conceptions and sketch my 
own basic portrait of  the functionality of  human reason. My aim is to inspire 
the reader to begin a critical and productive reflection on methodology in 
general and biblical exegetical methodology in particular.
The background of  Canale’s analysis of  Reason2 lies in the great variety 
of  contradicting theological systems.3 This state, in which the contemporary 
theological debate finds itself, is most problematic since it seems to hinder 
mutual understanding and unity. Furthermore, the current state of  theological 
disagreement challenges the very foundation of  Christian theology. 
Consequently, Canale sees the need for an analysis of  theological reason 
in order to discover the root of  the problem of  the many contradicting 
theological systems, all of  which claim to be rational and reasonable.4 In his 
dissertation, “A Criticism of  Theological Reason,” he inquires into the general 
formal structure and condition of  Reason by means of  a phenomenological 
analysis. Besides this, he searches for a biblical interpretation of  the primordial 
1Oliver Glanz, “Investigating the Presuppositional Realm of  Biblical-Theological 
Methodology, Part I: Dooyeweerd on Reason,” AUSS 47 (2009): 5-35.
2Throughout this text Reason, Logos, and Knowledge, when used in the specific 
Canalean sense, will be capitalized.
3Fernando Luis Canale, A Criticism of  Theological Reason: Time and Timelessness as 
Primordial Presuppositions, Andrews University Seminary Doctoral Dissertation Series 
10 (Berrien Springs: Andrews University Press, 1987), 10.
4Ibid., 3.
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presuppositions of  Reason. Both the formal structure of  Reason and its 
biblical interpretation on the level of  primordial presuppositions allow him to 
develop the possibility for theological criticism.
In my presentation of  Canale’s thought, I will start with a description 
of  his understanding of  Reason’s formal structure (1.2). Subsequently, I will 
describe how Canale sees the structure of  Reason at work from a biblical 
perspective (1.3).5 
2.2 Canale’s Structure of  Reason
2.2.1 Object of  Phenomenological Analysis: Reason
Reason, the object of  Canale’s phenomenological analysis, is not meant in its 
narrow sense as an ability that pertains to human being, a typically human 
cognitive potential or characteristic. Reason goes beyond the intellectual activity 
or logical thought of  the cognitive subject. Therefore, it is fundamentally 
different from Dooyeweerd’s understanding of  theoretical thought. The 
structure of  Reason is not the structure of  the epistemic; the interpretation 
of  Reason is not an epistemology. Canale uses Reason more broadly as that 
which makes meaning possible. Reason, therefore, includes all processes and 
structures by which meaning is constituted.6 Thus Reason is not limited to, but 
includes, rational analytic thinking. Different levels, factors, and aspects may 
pertain to Reason. Canale speaks of  Reason as being a whole, and the processes 
and frameworks it entails as being parts. This is important to understand 
because when Canale talks about the hypotheticity of  Reason, he does not 
refer to epistemology alone, but to all levels and processes of  Reason.
In A Criticism of  Theological Reason, Canale uses “Logos” or “Knowledge” 
as synonyms of  Reason. This may be confusing, but it shows the broad sense 
in which he analyzes Reason. Reason is understood hermeneutically. The 
primary function of  Reason, then, is to create and formulate meaning, i.e., 
to provide unity and coherence for that which surrounds us and is in us⎯to 
provide unity and coherence to the variety of  being (entities). In order to 
make this clearer, Canale explains that Reason as Logos can be described 
as that which enables the expression of  “meaningful words.”7  Theo-logy, 
for example, tries to express meaningful words about God. Meaning and its 
expression in words cannot be separated; they belong together as aspects of  
5The main source of  my presentation is Canale’s dissertation. However, his 
thought on the matter of  Reason did not find full expression in his dissertation. 
Additionally, not all of  his thinking had been published yet. For that reason not only 
Canale’s publications, but also e-mail communication with him helped me to clarify 
crucial elements of  his thought. Accordingly, not all the sources of  this presentation 
will be found in the bibliography.
6Canale, 45, n. 1.
7Ibid., 20, n. 1.
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the same rational activity. According to Canale, meaning is always logical in 
the broad sense of  the term.8 Meaning is always a product of  human Logos.
Consequently, Canale universalizes Reason to coincide with human 
knowledge. However, he does not want to be misunderstood as absolutizing 
Reason. The absolutization can only take place when it is made a particular 
capability of  human beings. Like Dooyeweerd, Canale criticizes the 
absolutization of  particular reason as observed in the history of  philosophy 
and particularly in classical and modern interpretations of  reason. 
The central question of  phenomenological analysis, then, is how 
Knowledge as Logos or Reason is possible. What is structurally demanded 
in order to be able to formulate meaning? This question is central, as Reason 
represents the human activity that generates meaning.9 Meaning is always 
constructed meaning. Consequently, there is no meaning outside of  Reason, 
i.e., no meaning outside of  Understanding.10 This implies that Knowledge 
can hinder further understanding, as Logos/Reason is the condition for 
understanding, misunderstanding, and even error. According to Canale, this 
allows for the experience of  meaning in something that is not understood. 
This is because nonunderstanding takes place when interpretation according to 
Logos is generated. What is the structure of  Logos that makes the expression 
of  meaningful words possible? What levels, factors, and aspects are involved 
in Reason in order to make Reason function?
To analyze Reason, then, means to analyze the constitution of  meaning 
as meaningful knowledge. In order to prevent the adoption of  an ideological 
starting point, Canale specifies his question in terms of  formal analysis. What 
is it that is structurally needed by Reason in order to construct meaning? He 
believes that one can discover the structure of  Reason only by means of  a 
phenomenological analysis that is concerned with the act of  knowing.
Only a phenomenological analysis will make it possible to uncover the 
given structure of  Reason apart from the actual interpretation of  Reason. 
Thus the description of  the structure of  Reason is not the formulation of  a 
theory of  Reason (which necessarily takes place in the development of  any 
ideology). In his phenomenological analysis, Canale seems to be constantly 
aware of  the danger of  including any ideology as a framework for interpreting 
Reason. Basically, he follows Hartmann’s phenomenological analysis.
Canale sees an urgent necessity for a structural analysis of  Reason 
because it is only on the basis of  a good structural understanding that one 
can build a theory in the full awareness of  its presuppositions. Although 
it is especially theoretical and scientific thinking that is the object of  his 
critique, nevertheless the structure of  Reason can be applied to both naïve 
8Ibid.
9Ibid., 10.
10Canale refers to “Understanding” in the most general way, rather than in a 
specific, concrete way.
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and theoretical thinking. The difference is that the structure of  Reason is 
made more explicit in theoretical knowing, while remaining implicit in naïve 
knowing.11
2.2.2 The Structure of  Reason
2.2.2.1 A General Description of  Reason’s 
Subject-Object Relationship
In order to create meaning, Reason needs a subject and an object. Both a 
knower (subject) and a known (object) are needed. This relational structure 
is a priori ontic condition for Reason. In any philosophical endeavor, the 
interpreted subject-object relation is a necessary fundamental of  a detailed 
construction of  a philosophical system. Thus the basic framework of  Reason 
is the subject–object relationship, and it is this relationship that is the center 
of  meaning. In the cognitive realm, i.e., Reason’s structure, the subject-object 
relation is at work. By “cognitive realm,” Canale means the very basic setting 
by which understanding is generated in both its general and specific sense.12 
“At work” means that the subject and object sides need to contribute to their 
relationship in order to create meaning. There are two directions because of  
the two perspectives that are at work: the perspective of  the object (direction: 
object ⇨ subject) and the perspective of  the subject (direction: subject ⇨ 
object). From the perspective of  the object, the communication of  its ontic 
properties (which in biblical rationality are the lines of  intelligibility, as I will 
discuss below) to the subject takes place. In this perspective, the subject is 
essentially receptive. From the perspective of  the subject, the subject creates a 
logical image/idea of  the object through its interpretative activity that enables 
it to grasp the object and create meaning. In this perspective, the subject is 
essentially active. The active interpreting of  the subject supposes a framework 
by which interpretation is possible. Consequently, the contribution of  the 
subject to the subject-object relation is presuppositional. This means that in 
order to generate meaning, the subject always contributes with some content 
in the form of  an interpretational framework. This content basically entails a 
foundational understanding of  the subject-object relation.
2.2.2.2 Reason’s Frameworks as Part of  the 
Subject-Object Relationship
The communication on the object’s side is characterized by its ontic properties. 
The epistemic potentiality of  the subject and the ontic properties of  the object 
need to be complementary, thus need to unite in the same Logos. This is why 
the concept of  the epistemic (epistemology) must unite with the concept 
of  the ontic (ontology). One can characterize the subject-object relation as 
11Canale, 27, n. 4.
12By “general” I mean the world in its totality; by “specific” I mean any chosen 
aspect of  reality.
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communicative when the concept of  the epistemic (epistemology) and the 
concept of  the ontic (ontology) are complementary. The presuppositional 
content that the cognitive subject needs in order to make sense of  the 
received ontic information of  the object demands some basic frameworks for 
interpretation. In the phenomenological analysis of  the structure of  Reason, 
on the most basic level one can detect three main frameworks: a concept of  
reality (ontological framework); a concept of  knowing, including a concept 
of  the functioning of  cognition (epistemological framework); and a concept 
of  a system that provides unity and guarantees coherence (theological 
framework). The formulation “epistemological framework” indicates that 
Reason structurally needs a concept of  the epistemic (epistemology) as a part 
of  its realm (framework). The “ontological framework” points to Reason’s 
structural need for a concept of  the ontic (ontology). The theological 
framework, or “system” as Canale puts it, holds together the epistemological 
and ontological framework in unity and coherence. Thus the structure of  
Reason demands that the ontic, epistemic, and theos need to be interpreted in 
order to make Reason function. Therefore, the ontological, epistemological, and 
theological frameworks of  the phenomenological structure of  Reason should 
not be understood as referring to an existing concept of  the ontic, epistemic, 
or theos, but to the structural necessity of  formulating a concept of  the 
ontic, epistemic, and theos. Reason necessarily works by the “logicalization” 
or conceptualization of  the ontic, epistemic, and theos. The interrelations 
between the three frameworks are “empty.” Their interpretation will bring 
forth structural interrelations.
The main feature of  the subject is its potentiality to become cognitively 
active: to interpret and create a meaningful image of  the object. In its 
cognitive activity, the subject is epistemically dependent on the object. The 
epistemological framework of  the structure of  Reason is mainly centered 
in the subject’s cognitive activity. Because of  this, Canale understands the 
epistemological framework to be dominated by the subject. The main 
feature of  the object in this fundamental relationship is its transobjectivity. 
Transobjectivity means two things: on the one hand, that the object exists in 
ontic independence from the subject, and, on the other hand, that the object 
is open in the sense that it does not hide, but communicates its properties 
within the structure of  Reason. Because of  this, the ontological framework 
in a way transcends the epistemological framework. The ontic can exist 
without the subject’s logic, but the epistemological framework cannot exist 
without the conceptualization of  the ontic as ontological framework. This 
ontological transcendence, through which all knowledge can be generated 
by the cognitive activity of  the subject, stems from projecting the content 
of  previously experienced and mentally stored subject-object relations 
on the object. Thus the ontic properties that were communicated in past 
subject-object relationships constitute the content of  the presuppositional 
contribution of  the subject to the present subject-object relationship. In this 
sense, transobjectivity refers to the fact that the object’s ontic properties are 
materialized in the memory of  the subject. Therefore, all knowledge that 
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originates from the cognitive activity of  the subject includes the objective 
contribution of  the past. Here one can see how the ontological framework, 
which is dominated by the object’s side, structurally interconnects with the 
epistemological framework, which is itself  dominated by the subject’s side. 
Reason, then, is not subjective Reason, but embraces both subject and object 
in their interrelation.
Besides the ontological and epistemological, Reason’s structure entails a 
third framework, the theological. To understand its function and place, I will 
introduce this framework after explaining the ontological and epistemological 
frameworks.
As we have seen, the basic structure of  Reason needs both a subject 
and an object: the subject, having epistemic potentiality, needs an object that, 
having ontic potentiality, is complementary in its logic. The epistemological 
and ontological frameworks need to be complementary in order to have a 
relationship. Without an ontological framework, the potentiality of  the subject 
cannot be activated. The subject is, therefore, dependent on the ontological 
framework and its complementarity.
The phenomenological analysis reveals that Reason’s frameworks are not 
external to but intrinsic features of  the structure of  Reason.
2.2.2.3 Ontological Framework
The concept of  ontic reality needs to include an understanding of  how a 
being (entity) relates to other beings (entities). The concept of  the ontic 
strives for unity and coherence among being-diversity in order to establish a 
meaningful understanding of  the ontic. Here Canale emphasizes the “logical” 
characteristic of  the ontological framework. He does not have a particular 
ontology in mind, but stresses that Reason’s structure needs an interpretation 
of  the ontic that corresponds to a certain logic: an ontology. The term 
“ontological framework” thus refers to the necessity of  interpreting the ontic 
and not to any specific ontology. Consequently, the ontological framework 
is in need of  an interpretation (a specific ontology) in order to let Reason’s 
structure function. An idea of  the ultimate as origin of  the diversity of  entity-
beings is structurally needed in order to establish a meaningful concept of  
the ontic (ontology). The idea of  the ultimate as origin allows being to be 
understood in coherence and unity. Ontology, therefore, needs a concept of  
Being, the ultimate ground of  being from which coherence and unity flow 
(theos).13 Being as the ultimate ground of  being is to be taken as that which 
allows for the existence of  entities, i.e., what is necessary for the existence of  
being.
The ontological framework, on which the epistemological framework 
depends, is itself  dependent on the theological framework. One could put 
it like this: the ontological framework communicates the ideas of  coherence 
and unity from the theological framework to the epistemological framework. 
This outcome of  the analysis leads Canale to the important conclusion that a 
13Canale, 35.
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criticism of  Reason is in urgent need of  a criticism of  ontology since it is the 
“center of  gravity of  Reason.”14
2.2.2.4 Epistemological Framework
Whereas the ontological framework is part of  the ontic realm of  the structure 
of  Reason, the epistemological framework belongs to the cognitive realm of  
the structure of  Reason. From the object’s side, knowledge is made possible 
through Being. From the subject’s side, knowledge is made possible through 
the epistemological framework. 
The cognitive activity that aims to construct an image of  the object 
demands an interpretational framework, also referred to as “categories.” The 
categories of  the subject enable knowledge and the constitution of  meaning. 
They are the necessary concepts to enable the understanding of  reality as 
it appears, and are, therefore, of  presuppositional character. Categories 
can be understood as schemes that are needed to place the properties 
communicated by the object. Without the categories of  the subject, a subject-
object relationship is structurally seen to be impossible. The content of  the 
cognitive categories of  the subject is prior to the subject-object relationship.15 
This content originates from previous cognitive activity in subject-object 
relationships. What the subject has received in the past from the object is 
stored inside the subject as presuppositions. The ontological framework then 
provides the categories for the constitution of  Meaning and the definition 
of  objectivity.16 Presuppositions, in their broad sense, refer to all the 
contents that are in the mind of  the subject when the subject knows. Every 
new cognitive experience is incorporated in the existing presuppositional 
categories in the mind of  the subject. These categories are not of  logical 
character only, but involve the complete diversity of  experience including, 
for example, sensations and social memories. In this sense, the subject 
projects the past onto the present. Through the phenomenological analysis 
that can uncover the three necessary and, therefore, structural frameworks 
among the many contents in the cognitive activity of  the subject, Meaning, 
which is generated by the subject’s cognitive activity, always assumes a basic 
interpretation of  these three frameworks. One can see that the structure of  
Reason (which embraces both subject and object) includes the interpretation 
of  Reason’s structure in the subject! This is crucial to understanding Canale’s 
analysis: the epistemological framework of  the structure of  Reason includes 
an interpretation of  the structure of  Reason. To put it differently: the global 
structure of  Reason includes a particular interpretation of  the structure of  
Reason within the subject of  Reason’s subject-object relationship. 
14Ibid., 36.
15Ibid., 39.
16Ibid., 41-43.
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The subject makes the subject-object relationship meaningful by 
applying its categories. In order to apply the three frameworks of  Reason, 
they need to be made complementary through a basic common logic. Thus 
the same logic needs to be applied to all of  the conceptualizations of  the 
ontic, epistemic, and theos. It is, however, not only this common logic that 
characterizes all frameworks, but also the prior subject-object relationships 
that are stored in the subject’s memory. Structurally, the concept of  the 
ontic can not be established without any background in the subject-object 
relationship. Through the ontological framework, Reason finds the ground for 
its systematic nature in the actual content that is given to Reason’s structure 
(interpretation of  the ontic). That this is the case can simply be seen in the fact 
that all interpretations of  the epistemological framework (epistemology) have 
a formulated concept of  what the “object” or “objectivity” is. These concepts 
of  the object are clear expressions of  an interpretation of  the ontological 
framework that is prior to any subject-object relationship.17 In this context, 
Canale says that the ontological framework is necessarily implanted in the 
epistemological framework, since the former provides the latter with the basis 
for the necessary (epistemological) categories.
Through the cognitive categories (three frameworks of  Reason), unity 
and coherence are created in the process of  creating images of  the objects 
through the cognitive subject. This leads us to the important conclusion 
that although the epistemological framework is grounded in the ontological 
framework, the subject interprets the ontic. This means that the concept 
of  the object finds its origin in the epistemic capacity of  the subject⎯any 
concept is of  epistemic character. Here one can easily see the circularity of  
the structure of  Reason: the epistemic and the ontic do not exist without 
each other.18 This circularity or interdependence stems from the relational 
character of  Reason itself. In any analysis of  Reason, one will uncover the 
subject-object relation as basic presupposition. As Reason embraces both 
subject and object, the origination of  Knowledge cannot be located in either 
the subject or the object. Knowledge has an intrinsically interdependent and 
relational character.
2.2.2.5 Theological Framework
As we have seen in the discussion of  the ontological framework, the particular 
concept of  unity and coherence is structurally rooted in the idea of  the 
17Ibid., 42-43.
18Canale does not formulate this clearly, but this conclusion flows naturally 
from his distinction between the “ground” and “form” of  the systematic nature of  
Reason. The functioning of  the systematic nature of  Reason is determined by the 
epistemological framework, while the ground of  the systematic nature of  Reason is 
deteremined by the ontological framework.
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ultimate as theos.19 The concept of  theos is, therefore, the ground for any 
unity and coherence functioning in the subject’s framework of  interpretation.20 
The cognitive categories that establish unity and coherence through the 
interpretative act of  the subject are derived from the concept of  the ontic 
reality whose unity and coherence is founded in the idea of  the theos. The 
phenomenological analysis goes beyond ontology as the ground of  cognitive 
categories into the ground of  ontology itself: the theos, as ultimate expression 
of  the ontos (being rooted in Being). Again, we see how the concept of  the 
ontic represents the “center of  gravity of  Reason.”21 
What can be concluded from this analysis is that Reason’s systematic nature 
shows that the constitution of  meaning flows from the concept of  the whole 
(basic understanding of  the ontic) to the concept of  the part (understanding 
of  an object) rather than the other way around. The phenomenological 
analysis of  Reason reveals that the meaning of  the whole is not determined 
by the meaning of  any single part. Rather, every part finds its own particular 
meaning in relation to the meaning of  the whole.22 Consequently, the cognitive 
subject needs to be backed up by a basic understanding of  the whole (i.e., a 
worldview or cosmology) in order to establish a meaningful subject-object 
relation. Such a basic worldview enables the subject to create a meaningful 
subject-object relation because it can formulate a coherence and unified idea 
of  the object. The ground of  the cosmology is found in the ultimate idea of  
the origin, or theos as Being (as Dooyeweerd’s terminology would put it).23 
The concept of  the theos, the theological framework, ultimately guarantees 
and articulates the complementarity of  the subject-object relationship because 
the theos is the origin of  this relationship. 
This dependent relationship, seen from the perspective of  the theological 
framework (theos-ontos-epistemic), is one of  the three possible formal 
directions of  the circle of  dependencies between the three frameworks of  
the structure of  Reason. Here meaning starts with a concept of  the theos 
(system), from which a concept of  the ontic can be established, from which, 
in turn, the epistemic categories can be derived.
19Canale explains that “Theos” is just the theological expression of  the secular 
philosophical concept of  “the One.” From a Christian perspective “the One” is called 
“Theos,” while from a secular perspective “Theos” is called “the One.” Canale, 63, n. 1.
20Ibid., 48-49.
21Ibid., 36.
22Ibid., 47.
23“Being” is differently used in Dooyeweerd’s writing. “Being” is not understood 
as a necessary characteristic that allows things to exist, but as the necessary origin that 
creates the existence of  things. Therefore, to Dooyeweerd “Being” is a synonym for 
God.
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Understanding the necessary grounding function of  the theological 
framework of  the structure of  Reason, we still need to acknowledge that the 
theos is the ultimate expression of  the ontological framework and implies 
ontological concepts. This acknowledgement is crucial to understand the second 
of  the three formal directions of  the circle of  dependencies. In this direction, 
meaning starts with a concept of  the ontic. Here the circle runs like this: the 
cognitive categories of  the epistemological framework are formally grounded in 
the ontological framework, which again is formally grounded in the theological 
framework, which in turn is formally grounded in the ontological framework, 
since a concept of  the theos implies basic ontic notions. 
With this conclusion in mind, one needs to realize that even the concept 
of  the ontic is a concept. Conceptualization itself  points to the epistemological 
framework that allows the cognitive subject to start its interpretative and 
conceptualizing activity. Here we see the third of  the three possible formal 
directions: meaning starts with a concept of  the logos.
2.2.3 Beyond the Perspective of  Any 
of  the Three Frameworks
The phenomenological analysis of  the structure of  Reason so far revealed that 
every single framework builds upon the other two frameworks. The structure 
of  Reason does not give priority in the sense of  an absolute starting point to 
any of  these frameworks. None of  the frameworks is independent from each 
other and, therefore, none of  them can become a starting point within the 
structure of  Reason. Although the theological framework functions as the 
ultimate ground of  being, it cannot represent the ultimate starting point since 
it conceals a logia and an ontos.24 The reason for the complementarity of  the 
three frameworks is found in the logic of  the interpreting subject. The concepts 
of  the ontic, epistemic, and theos as onto-logy, epistemo-logy, and theo-logy 
need to share in the same logic in order to be complementary. However, the 
complementarity does not result from the logical interpretation of  the subject 
alone, but also from the structural interdependence of  the three frameworks 
that have been referred to as the three possible formal directions in the circle 
of  dependencies. Thus what makes the three frameworks interdependent is 
the fact that they structurally share in a common logic.
What should be clear so far is that the very presupposition of  Reason is a 
subject-object relationship that establishes Knowledge. In order to understand 
this relationship, an interpretation of  the three frameworks of  Reason is 
necessary. Without such an interpretation, we cannot find understanding 
or express meaningful words since outside of  Reason there is no meaning. 
The interpretation of  the frameworks has an interdependent character: every 
framework depends on the other two frameworks. Although the theological 
framework formally functions as the source of  coherence and unity for all 
concepts by articulating the interrelation between the frameworks of  Reason, 
24Canale, 51.
227inveStiGatinG the PreSuPPOSitiOnal realm . . . , Part ii
it is not independent.25 This is not to say that the theos is dependent, but that 
the concept of  the theos is not independent since it implies a basic ontological 
content while functioning as the ultimate expression of  the ontological 
framework. A further phenomenological analysis should, therefore, make 
this basic ontological content the object of  study. Because of  this, Canale’s 
phenomenological analysis proceeds and reveals foundational ontology as the 
ultimate cognitive reference in the structure of  Reason. This conclusion is 
argued in the following way:
All three frameworks (epistemo-logical, theo-logical, and onto-logical) 
are structurally built upon Logos. Consequently, what lies beyond the 
interpretation of  all three frameworks is Logos itself.26 Of  what character 
must the minimum content of  Logos be? And where does that minimum 
content come from⎯where does the logic of  the Logos come from? Canale 
tries to answer this question by referring to Heidegger, who argues that “-logy 
hides more than just the logical in the sense of  what is consistent and generally 
in the nature of  a statement [. . . ] In each case, the Logia is the totality of  
a nexus of  grounds accounted for, within which nexus the objects of  the 
sciences are represented in respect of  their ground, that is, are conceived.” Of  
importance, however, is that “Ontology, however, and theology are ‘Logies’ 
[sic] inasmuch as they provide the ground of  beings as such and account for 
them within the whole. They account for Being as the ground of  beings. They 
account to the Logos, and are in an essential sense in accord with the Logos, that 
is they are the logic of  the Logos.”27 
Canale argues that the logic by which we conceptualize the ontic, epistemic, 
and theos is grounded in a Logos that is basically identical to the ground of  
being. This Logos functions as the minimum content of  the subject’s logic. If  
one wants to find out what the content of  that Logos is, one needs to search 
for the nexus that is present in all three frameworks. One needs to go beyond 
the three frameworks of  Reason’s structure by searching for that which they 
share as a unity. That which goes beyond any concept is Being. Through the 
theological framework, all frameworks imply a logic whose categories are 
grounded in the basic interpretation of  the ontic as Being, i.e., an interpretation 
of  that which is necessary for existence, i.e., foundational ontology. Because of  their 
logical character, all three frameworks imply the same foundational ontology. 
Foundational ontology accounts for the complementarity of  the frameworks. 
25It is important to see that in the phenomenological structure the theos cannot 
be seen as the origin of  the ontic. Phenomenologically, the theos needs to be seen 
as the principle of  articulating the ontological and epistemological framework. The 
understanding of  the theos as the origin of  the ontic reality belongs to the “material” 
side of  the formal phenomenological structure of  Reason. Formally, the theos 
functions as an empty concept that does not require the notion of  creation.
26Canale, 52, n. 2.
27Ibid., 51.
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Here the phenomenological analysis arrives at its most foundational point. 
Being as foundational ontology is the minimum content of  being, and at the 
same time Being embraces all human concepts. 
The meaning of  Being can be found in every meaning of  being, since it is 
the meaning of  Being that provides the ground for any meaning, coherence, and 
unity.28 But “Being” is not understood as a container within which reality takes 
place, but as “an overall quality shared by everything real.”29 “Being” is “not 
a thing in which all other things have their being” and does not “appear or is 
given to us as a ‘thing’, but co-appears with all things as a basic characteristic of  
their being.”30 Being cannot be understood as origin of  what is, but as adjunct to 
all that exists (including theos).31 Therefore, Being does not exist “by itself  nor 
apart from what-is.”32 When Canale refers to Being as ground or foundation for any 
interpretation of  Reason, it should be understood as the necessary condition 
for the generation of  Meaning.33 Being should not be confused with the role 
theos is playing. Being is not the origin of  the ontic, but a basic adjunct for the 
possibility of  being. Nevertheless, one could say that Being as the primordial 
presupposition has the function of  the theos in the sense that coherence is 
established from it.34 The difference is that the dimensionality is not the logic 
by which all frameworks are interpreted, but the Logos of  the logic. This 
means that Logos goes beyond the theological framework that functions in the 
interrelation with the other frameworks of  Reason as origin of  coherence and 
unity. The Logos then finds expression within the concept of  theos.35 
One could say the concept of  Being is the first and last concept on 
which all other concepts are built. There is no concept that can go beyond 
28Ibid., 68
29Fernando Luis Canale, Basic Elements of  Christian Theology: Scripture Replacing 
Tradition (Berrien Springs: Andrews University Lithotech, 2005), §38b.
30Ibid., §38a.
31Byung-Chul Han, Martin Heidegger: Eine Einführung (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 
1999), 11, 13. Canale does not exclude the possibility that there are more primordial 
presuppositions. But the fact that in philosophy there are at least two different primordial 
presuppositions at work is for him reason enough to set the stage for a criticism of  
theological Reason. See Canale, A Criticism of  Theological Reason, 74, n. 1.
32Heidegger, cited in Canale, A Criticism of  Theological Reason, 71, n. 1.
33Ibid., 72-73.
34By “primordial” Canale means the basic characteristic that conditions our 
understanding of  what is real. Canale, “Basic Elements of  Christian Theology,” §38.
35Theos-Being, then, is the necessary condition for any concept of  being.
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the concept of  Being. The phenomenological analysis, therefore, finds the 
borderline between Being and the concept of  Being. There is no reasoning 
beyond Being, but all reasoning starts with a concept of  Being. The concept 
of  Being functions as an unconditional whole to which all the other cognitive 
categories and frameworks of  Reason relate as parts. This is why there is a 
necessary minimum concept of  Being at work in the interpretation of  being. 
As present in every understanding of  being, the concept of  Being has an 
overarching meaning. The presence of  Being as concept in the human mind is 
necessarily assumed in the constitution of  all meanings and the interpretation 
of  all the presuppositional frameworks of  Reason. The very nexus of  all 
three frameworks is to be found in foundational ontology, because the Logos 
shares in all of  Reason’s frameworks. When one starts to uncover the different 
concepts of  the foundational ontological level of  the structure of  Reason, 
one will discover the different contents it has been given in the history of  
philosophy. Canale’s overview of  the primordial presuppositions that have 
been adapted in history will be briefly discussed in 1.3.1 and 1.3.2. 
Because the concept of  Being functions as the first and all-embracing 
concept by which everything else is conditioned, it reveals the primordial, 
unconditional, or hypothetical character of  Reason. The concept of  Being, 
functioning as Logos, is not conditioned by any logic, since it is the ground 
for logic itself, but by a choice of  the subject. In this context, Canale speaks 
of  the spontaneity of  the subject: the freedom of  the subject to choose its 
primordial presuppositions that will guide the course of  its thinking.36 
The spontaneity of  the subject is the most profound philosophical 
responsibility of  the human subject. Since the primordial presupposition both 
affects the nexus and ground of  all three frameworks of  Reason’s structure 
and is spontaneously chosen, we can conclude that, at its very core, Reason 
is of  a hypothetical character. Hypotheticity, thus, pertains to the whole of  
Reason’s structure.
Consequently, Canale is correct in stating that ultimate meaning is 
not grounded in knowledge in the strict sense of  logical deduction, but 
in a “postulate” or “faith.”37 This “postulate” or “faith” is necessary for 
Reason’s functioning and therefore part of  Reason’s formal structure. It 
is this primordial presuppositional framework, or, differently called, “the 
dimensionality of  Reason” or “ground of  being,” that the subject brings to 
the subject-object relationship and that predominantly determines the means 
and end of  the process of  creating an image of  the object.
36Canale, A Criticism of  Theological Reason, 24, 73. The spontaneity of  the subject, 
however, is not only responsible for the choice of  the priordial presuppositions, but 
also for the interpretation of  all a priori conditions or hermeneutical presuppositions, 
i.e., the basic interpetation of  Reason’s frameworks, required on the subject side for 
the constitution of  knowledge (see ibid., 57).
37Ibid., 56, 65, 73.
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So all frameworks (epistemological, theological, and ontological) find 
their source in the meaning of  Being. The analysis of  the meaning of  Being 
leads us beyond metaphysics, that is beyond cosmology or worldview to the 
very ground.
The discussion of  the phenomenological analysis ends here.
2.2.4 Doing Philosophy
In doing philosophy, the spontaneity of  the subject is not only active when 
a concept of  Being as primordial presupposition is to be chosen.38 Creative 
philosophizing in general (e.g., interpretation of  Reason’s frameworks) can only 
take place due to the existence of  a spontaneous subject. In its philosophical 
endeavor, the spontaneous subject can choose its own direction and complexity. 
The individually chosen dimensionality of  Reason, however, functions as the 
starting point of  philosophy. Starting with the primordial presupposition, 
which is the minimum knowledge that Reason needs to understand the theos, 
the ontological framework can be interpreted (as happens, e.g., in traditional 
metaphysics: dealing with beings as beings). After the ontological framework is 
developed, the epistemological framework can be established.39 
According to Canale, the phenomenological reality of  the spontaneity of  
the subject explains the fact that there are different possible interpretations 
of  the same things. 
2.2.5 The Need for a Historical Analysis
In a further step of  his phenomenological historical analysis, Canale shows 
what different interpretations have been given to foundational ontology in 
the course of  the history of  philosophy. Such a historical analysis is necessary 
since a further phenomenological analysis will not help to uncover the material 
interpretation of  Being. The material content of  the interpretation of  Being 
can be discovered only through a historical analysis.40 
Time and timelessness will be uncovered as the two possible interpretations 
of  Reason’s dimensionality in which philosophy has thought so far.
2.3 Canale’s Interpretations of  the 
Structure of  Reason
As the structure of  Reason shows, there are two crucial decisions the 
spontaneity of  the subject needs to involve itself  in. One concerns the actual 
interpretation of  Reason’s dimensionality, the other the formal direction 
38Ibid., 31, 57.
39It is, however, not necessary to develop a complete ontology before an 
epistemology can be constructed since the required ultimate ground is not found in 
ontology, but in foundational ontology.
40Canale, A Criticism of  Theological Reason, 85, n. 1.
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of  the circle of  dependencies. The second choice entails three options of  
perspective, i.e., ordo: the ontos-perspective, theos-perspective, or logos-
perspective. The theos, however, always represents the ultimate horizon of  the 
interpretational activity. The historical overview in this section is categorized 
in terms of  these two decisions.
2.3.1 Classical Timeless Dimensionality
In the following, I present Canale’s understanding of  the classical interpretation 
of  Reason’s dimensionality. In doing so, I will abstain from evaluating his 
outline, as this is beyond the scope of  this paper. 
2.3.1.1 Interpretation from the Viewpoint 
of  the Onto-theo-logical Ordo
The interpretation of  Being in the early Greek philosophy of  Parmenides set 
the ground for all further developments in Western philosophy. The reflection 
on being as imperfect and limited and the search for a theos that would provide 
coherence and unity led to the idea that Being is essentially timeless. This 
decision implied that perfection was defined in terms of  timelessness, which 
meant that perfection was not considered under the influence of  change due 
to time. Where time was excluded, the realm of  the ideal, completeness, and 
immutable source of  being could be located. As being was considered temporal 
and changeable, and Being timeless and unchangeable, Being could be defined 
as that which does “not come into being” because of  its absolute perfection. 
An opposition was thus created between the timeless and temporal realms. 
The distinction was able to account for the wide diversity of  the experienced 
temporal world, while preserving unity and coherence through the origin of  all 
temporal being, i.e., timeless theos-Being.
The ontologically grounded timeless definition of  Being as dimensionality 
of  Reason was not only presented by Parmenides, but also adopted and 
further developed by Plato and Aristotle. It characterized almost all of  
classical Occidental philosophical thinking. Further, it exemplified an onto-
theo-logical ordo. The reflection on the ontic became the starting point for 
the flow of  meaning: from the ontos to the theos to the logos. From the 
logic of  a timeless Logos, i.e., a timeless dimensionality of  Reason, ontology, 
theology, and epistemology are constructed.
2.3.1.2 Interpretation from the Viewpoint of  
the Logical-onto-theo Ordo
The Cartesian paradigm and the influence of  Kant changed the direction of  
the flow of  meaning by grounding the interpretation of  the dimensionality of  
Reason in the epistemological framework. Thus the ontological foundation of  
Reason’s dimensionality was replaced by the transcendental-epistemological 
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foundation. The interpretation of  Reason’s ordo therefore changed, but 
Being was still interpreted as timeless. Starting with Kant, philosophy began 
to give Reason’s structure a different ordo, but not a different dimensionality. 
Classical timeless Being was substituted by modern timeless Logos. Thus, with 
the change of  ordo, there was not a corresponding change of  dimensionality. 
The turn to the epistemological framework led to an immanent cognitive 
foundation, the so-called “turn to the subject.”41  This “turn to the subject” 
was the consequence of  grounding the categories of  the subject in the 
epistemic realm rather than in the ontic. 
2.3.1.3 Timeless Dimensionality and Its Consequence 
for Ontology and Epistemology
In order to clearly see how a timeless dimensionality of  Reason affects 
the ontological and epistemological frameworks, they will be discussed 
individually.
2.3.1.3.1 Ontological Framework
When Being is defined as timeless, the ontological framework consequently 
conceives ultimate reality as timeless. The idea of  timelessness is not to be 
confused with the ideas of  “having no beginning or end,” “not restricted 
to a particular time or date,” or “not affected by time: ageless,” but strictly 
refers to exclusion of  time. Timelessness further implies that Being exists 
independently from the cognitive subject.42 This means that the interpretation 
of  Being as timeless automatically creates a gap between being and Being, 
as they do not share the same time frame. This gap, albeit in different ways, 
exists in both the Platonic and Kantian line of  thinking. 
In the relation between Being as truth and being as doxa, the latter is 
the temporal expression of  timeless Being. This means that, in the world 
of  doxa, we do not encounter Being itself, but a phenomenon that stands in 
an analogical relation to Being. The world of  doxa as the world of  temporal 
imitation of  its timeless essence relates to Being by participation in various 
degrees of  analogy. 
Timelessness, then, is the conception that ultimate reality (God) is 
essentially incompatible with time and space. In this line of  thinking, reality 
necessarily transcends the world of  doxa and appearance, which is bound to 
historical and analogical doxa-reality.43 
41Fernando Luis Canale, Back to Revelation-Inspiration: Searching for the Cognitive 
Foundation of  Christian Theology in a Postmodern World (Landham, MD: University Press 
of  America, 2001), 17-19.
42Ibid., 78.
43Ibid., 37.
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2.3.1.3.2 Epistemological Framework
From the viewpoint of  timelessness, a chorismos is created between doxa 
and truth. This chorismos is also found in the epistemological framework. It 
enters cognitive activity when the obtainment of  true knowledge requires 
transcending the temporal and sensory world. In order to enter the world 
of  ideas or truth, cognitive activity needs to involve itself  in a process of  
abstraction that seeks to overcome the temporality of  being. If  reason wants 
to reach into the realm of  timelessness in order to come to true understanding, 
it must belong to the realm of  timelessness itself. This need was the ground 
of  the classical notion of  the agens intellectus, an entity located in the timeless 
soul, able to abstract the timeless essence from the temporal and sensory 
world.44 
The classical interpretation of  Reason as belonging to the timeless realm 
reveals its ignorance or unawareness of  the hypothetical structure of  Reason. 
It is this hypothetical structure that makes the different choices in regard to 
the dimensionalities of  Reason and to the theos idea (having independence-
status) possible.
As discussed, in the Cartesian and Kantian paradigm the timeless 
interpretation of  Reason’s dimensionality was not rooted in the ontic, but 
in the epistemic realm. Another difference in these traditions is that the 
cognitive access to timelessness was made impossible by making the agens 
intellectus temporal. Thus the agens intellectus did not enter the world of  truth 
and ideas, or the things in itself, but only the phenomena. 
Kant’s attempt to ground Reason’s dimensionality in the epistemological 
framework automatically resulted in a “turn to the subject.” In this turn, 
philosophy lost the ability to acquire absolute knowledge, i.e., to reach the 
thing in itself, since the dimensionality of  Reason was not grounded in ultimate 
reality anymore. The world of  truth and ideas became inaccessible. In classical 
thinking, one tried to overcome the chorismos between the timeless essence and 
temporal appearance by timeless reason. In the modern paradigm, this chorismos 
could not be overcome anymore, as it was not certain whether the ontic world 
actually had a different dimensionality than the epistemic. The certainty of  
the complementarity of  the two frameworks was lost, and thus the basis for 
objectivity. With this problem, the cognitive process of  “abstraction” got a new 
limitation. Timeless Logos no longer gained absolute knowledge of  timeless 
Being through abstraction, but gained objective knowledge of  the temporal 
world as scientific knowledge. Later philosophical attempts were made to 
overcome this gap by seeking means to access the realm of  Being. These 
attempts did, however, fail to fundamentally criticize the whole conception of  
timelessness. Canale’s reference to Jaspers is a good example.45 Jaspers thought 
that certainty about the existence of  Being is somehow possible through the 
existential sensitivity of  being: the subject is able to “hear” the transcendence 
44Ibid., 78.
45Canale, A Criticism of  Theological Reason, 108-110.
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of  the timeless realm through a “metaphysical experience.” Knowledge of  
Being clearly lost its objectivity here, and timeless foundational ontology went 
uncriticized.
2.3.2 Postmodern Temporal Dimensionality
According to Canale, it took centuries until the classical and modern 
timeless understanding of  the foundational ontic world were questioned and 
criticized. Husserl, and later Heidegger, started to interpret the ontological 
realm as basically temporal.46 Heidegger’s temporal interpretation of  the 
dimensionality of  Reason provided a new definition of  time. The character 
of  time was no longer understood from the viewpoint of  the timeless, but 
from the viewpoint of  the temporal. This meant that time was understood 
from the viewpoint of  its temporality, i.e., the flux of  time. In this new setting, 
Being was not timeless anymore, but historical.
2.3.2.1 Ontological Framework
The consequence of  the notion of  temporal dimensionality was that entities 
did not receive their existence through their timeless essence anymore, but 
were fully temporal. Interpreting both Being and being as temporal meant to 
overcome the duality between form and matter, truth and doxa. Since both 
Being and being were temporal and historical, there was nothing beyond the 
phenomenon anymore. The realm of  being and appearance was the realm of  
Being as well. In fact, doxa was Being. There was no reality beyond time. As 
the gap between subject and object was overcome, the distinction between 
the thing in itself  and its appearance became unnecessary. What classical and 
modern philosophies meant by the “thing in itself ” as ultimate reality became 
temporal.
2.3.2.2 Epistemological Framework
The epistemological framework also received a new interpretation through 
the temporal dimensionality of  Reason. Mental categories were no longer 
derived from the immanent transcendental cognitive grounding of  Reason’s 
dimensionality (Kant), or from the timeless transcendental ontological 
grounding (classical philosophy). Instead, the Lebenswelt provided the material 
for the consciousness of  the subject.47 This means that the a priori categories 
of  the subject were derived from the historical past. The content of  the 
categories and the creation of  a unified and coherent image of  the object are 
thus not determined by the participation in the timeless world of  ideas, but 
by the temporal epistemological flow from past to present to future. Theos 
lost its timelessness. With this loss, temporal reason needed to redefine the 
46Canale, Back to Revelation-Inspiration, 7.
47Canale, A Criticism of  Theological Reason, 118, 133-135.
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theos and develop a new temporal metaphysics.48 Further, concepts such 
as “objectivity” and “abstraction” needed a redefinition. Objectivity and 
abstraction needed to be understood from the viewpoint of  temporal logos, 
which is in continuity with the Lebenswelt. Objectivity as the aim of  abstraction 
did not refer to transcending the sensory-temporal world anymore. The 
essence of  reality was not sought in the realm of  timelessness, but in the realm 
of  the flux of  time. This new location of  essence led to a new understanding 
of  abstraction. Abstract thought would encompass less than the Lebenswelt, as 
the Lebenswelt could not be reduced to a final absolute idea. Thus, because of  
reduction, objectivity became less encompassing than the Lebenswelt.49 
2.3.3 Biblical Temporal Dimensionality
The content of  the ground of  Being as the first basic ontic concept, through 
which Being can be understood, is either subjectively guessed or objectively 
revealed. Only when the ground of  Being is revealed can the subject start to 
uncover its dimensionality without depending on its own imaginative powers. 
Being a biblical Christian, Canale investigates the biblical expression of  the 
ground of  Being. On the basis of  a phenomenological analysis of  several biblical 
passages, he shows that the Bible expresses Being. What dimensionality does 
biblical Being express? Although the Bible does not systematically develop 
a theory of  Being and does not give an explicit interpretation to Reason’s 
frameworks, the Bible as rational fact (as expressing meaningful words) must 
be structurally seen to contain an interpretation of  the dimensionality of  
Reason. This means that one cannot discover the dimensionality of  Reason 
through a phenomenological analysis of  the Bible’s epistemological and 
ontological theory (since they do not exist), but can discover it through the 
passages where the biblical writer considers Being in a naïve way. At this 
point, Canale analyzes Exod 3:1-4:17 and Exod 6:2-7. The passage of  Exod 
3:1–4:17 utters Being prior to any expression of  a theory of  ontology or 
epistemology. The understanding of  the biblical expression of  Being should 
function as basis for any theorizing activity of  Christians and Jews.
2.3.3.1 Biblical Interpretation of  the Ground of  Being
Canale’s phenomenological analysis shows that Exod 3 speaks about Being 
in the present tense and connects God’s existence with an understanding 
of  Being. Canale shows that especially the meaning of  the sound-name of  
YHWH as the God of  Israel reveals the dimensionality of  God’s being as 
grounded in an understanding of  Being that is characterized by temporal 
openness.
Again, I will not argue for or against Canale’s exegetical analysis here 
because of  the scope of  this article series, but will simply present his⎯in my 
opinion convincing⎯results.
48See the attempt to develop a new temporal metaphysic in ibid., 141-153.
49Ibid., 135.
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When God appears and explains his sound-name YHWH, the Bible 
depicts him as essentially a being-mission God. This being-mission character 
refers to the temporal openness of  God’s presence to past and future time. It 
means that God is concerned with and active in the many generations of  his 
people, fulfilling the promises given to past generations. His being-mission 
identity extends through all three time ec-stasies. Canale understands this 
temporal extension (ec-stasies) as “temporal openness.” “Extension” points 
to the fact that temporal Being cannot be reduced and frozen to a static reality. 
Thus extension points to Being’s manifold ontic appearances that constitute 
the ontological basis for cognitive activity. In order to grasp the meaning of  
a subject matter, the cognitive subject must gather in “tension” the lines of  
intelligibility that flow from the temporal “extension” in which its object is 
found.
In Exod 3:2 and its context, the ontic presence of  God springs from 
the self-revelation of  God. This shows that God’s presence is understood as 
YHWH himself  appearing in time. The biblical verbal expression shows that 
there is no ontological gap between God’s being and his appearance.50 Thus 
the appearance of  YHWH is YHWH himself. Being is here identified with 
appearance, and not with something that is behind or beyond appearance. 
This connection has the character of  co-appearance: God’s being necessarily 
co-appears with the ground of  Being. Being appears through God’s presence 
and self-revelation. In this view, ontology cannot precede the study of  
God because there is no reflection on Being prior to God’s ontic presence. 
Regarding the interrelated frameworks of  Reason, the Bible expresses a clear 
theo-onto-logical order within the flow of  meaning. This implies that the 
ground of  Being can only be interpreted when God appears or is present. 
Since the God of  the Bible co-appears with and expresses the ground of  his 
Being, his ontic presence can and should function as starting point for the 
interpretation of  the dimensionality of  Reason. 
Since the biblical passages depict God’s presence as open to all three 
temporal ec-stasies (past-present-future) while it co-appears with Being, the 
biblical dimensionality of  Being is revealed as temporal.51 
In the following section, I will briefly sketch how this understanding 
of  Being’s dimensionality affects the interpretation of  Reason’s frameworks, 
which all need to share structurally in the same temporal nexus.
2.3.3.2 Ontological Framework
The consequence of  a temporal dimensionality is that being is necessarily 
temporal, as it is grounded in temporal Being. Consequently, temporal 
appearance can be considered real being that co-appears with Being. Meaning, 
then, is essentially connected with both past and future, as it is grounded in 
50The Nifal form of  har shows that God himself  is subject and object of  the 
appearance.
51Canale, A Criticism of  Theological Reason, 393.
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temporal Being and the meaning of  “presence” is immediately filled by the 
“lines of  intentionality” that come to it from its past and future extension.52 
The classical problem of  the chorismos and solution of  the analogia entis 
are overcome in biblical philosophy, inasmuch as biblical thought portrays 
the phenomenon as ultimate reality. Biblical thought, however, does not 
reject the analogia entis, but redefines it. In contrast to the classical timeless 
dimensionality, biblical temporal dimensionality requires a continuity between 
that which is given in the presence of  appearance and that which is beyond 
the moment of  presence, i.e., the temporal extension of  being in past and 
future appearance. Biblical analogies thus refer to temporal extensions instead 
of  temporal-timeless mediations. 
The material character of  the being-appearance is not discovered in one 
moment of  present time, but in its temporal extension. The biblical text itself  
refers to this dynamic character, since it reveals a clear progression in time of  
the meaning of  the sound-name YHWH.
2.3.3.3 Theological Framework
There seems to be a tension between the independent, unconditioned status 
of  theos and foundational ontology, which conditions any interpretation of  
Reason’s frameworks—including the theological framework. The concept 
of  God as grounded in the concept of  Being seems to make foundational 
ontology more foundational than God. Does this relation not dissolve the 
independent status of  God as origin of  and condition for everything, since 
foundational ontology seems to condition our concept of  God (theology)?
In response to this question, three important statements must be made. 
First, the nature of  the structure of  Reason is logical, not ontical. That is, for 
the existence of  Reason the ontic existence of  human being is required but 
the operation of  the structure of  Reason is logical and not ontical. Second, 
Being is not understood as an entity that could function as the originator of  
ontic reality; it is not perceived as a container within which reality takes place, 
but as a necessary adjunct to all that exists (cf. 2.2.3). Third, it is true that 
foundational ontology determines theology. 
The first statement indicates that it is crucial to make a distinction 
between ontic and ontology on the one hand, and theos and theology on the 
other. Just as ontology is not reality itself  but merely a concept of  it, theology 
is not theos itself  but just a concept of  it. In any concept, logic turns an 
object (e.g., ontic reality or God) into a cognitive reality. As the ontic “calls” to 
be understood through an ontology, the biblical God “calls” to be understood 
through a theology on the basis of  his revelation. Thus the ontic being of  
God is not determined by foundational ontology in the sense that the latter 
“creates” God, but that the latter allows for a conception of  God. 
Besides this, the formal structure of  Reason would not allow for an 
understanding of  Being as origin, as Being is not understood as a thing that 
has existence but as no-thing that necessarily co-appears with reality. Thus 
52Ibid., 377, n. 2.
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foundational ontology has logical priority in the constitution of  meaning. 
Therefore, foundational ontology only describes the most general characteristic 
of  reality, which is merely one of  the probably infinite characteristics of  God. 
This excludes the idea that foundational ontology, which is revealed by God, 
could be independent from God.
2.3.3.4 Epistemological Framework
If  Being, and thus theos, are temporal, Logos also needs to function as 
temporal Logos, i.e., the very ground of  the cognitive categories must be 
temporal as well. This is not just logically deducible from Reason’s structure. 
Exodus 6 explains that true understanding of  God takes place when God’s 
being is remembered, experienced, and hoped for in the three temporal ec-
stasies. Canale’s analysis of  Exod 3 shows that the text is concerned with who 
God is. In the analysis of  Exod 6, Canale shows that the text is focused on 
how to know God.
The connection between the appearance and the knowledge of  God 
in Exod 6 reveals their essential interrelation. Appearance and knowledge 
share the same ontological foundation or nexus. That all Reason’s frameworks 
share the same nexus finds its biblical expression in Exod 6:3. This text first 
states that ontologically God’s appearance provides the ground for man’s 
knowledge of  him. Then it stresses that epistemologically the meaning of  
the sound-name of  God makes knowledge of  God’s being possible. Thus 
epistemologically Reason functions in the Being-meaning of  the sound-name, 
i.e., in temporal extension. In the biblical understanding of  the epistemological 
framework, the content of  the cognitive categories that create meaning in 
unity and coherence is derived from past encounters with God’s appearance.53 
Thus a prior understanding of  (a) theos and (b) his ground of  Being enables 
the epistemological framework to coherently conceptualize the ontic. The 
cognitive process has to proceed temporally in order to discover the meaning 
of  being through a gathering process of  past-present-future extensions of  
co-appearing Being-appearance.
The concept of  temporal Logos demands a new understanding of  
the process of  cognitive activity. Abstraction and objectivity need a new 
definition. If  the ontic extension is the basis for the cognitive process, we need 
to think of  a process that gathers the dynamic ontic extensions of  an entity 
(this is the case both for naïve and scientific thinking).54 Knowledge is always 
a construction that builds upon the past, is formulated in the present, and 
assumes a future. Thus abstract knowledge always takes place in the future, 
53Ibid., 371, n. 2.
54See Oliver Glanz, “Time, Reason and Religious Belief: A Limited Comparison, 
Critical Assessment, and Further Development of  Herman Dooyeweerd’s Structural 
Analysis of  Theoretical Thought and Fernando Canale’s Phenomenological Analysis 
of  the Structure of  Reason and Its Biblical Interpretation (Master’s thesis, Vrije 
Universiteit, Amsterdam, 2006), 64-65.
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or there where the knowledge of  the future is accessible in the present time. 
It is in this context that prophecy and fulfillment play an important role in 
the redefinition of  abstract knowledge. Whereas the classical understanding 
of  knowledge involves a process of  abstraction that eliminates the historical 
and temporal world in order to enter the timeless realm of  ideas, the biblical 
temporal understanding of  knowledge involves a process of  cognitive 
extension-tension, i.e., gathering the lines of  intelligibility (data) generated by 
the temporally extended subject matter. Here abstract knowledge is not what 
is timeless, but what is gathered from the temporal lines of  a subject matter 
into a logical concept. Abstraction as the concept of  the totality of  theos’s 
ontic extensions in logical gathering also includes what has not yet become 
present or past but is still part of  the future ec-stasy of  the subject matter. 
Abstract words are words of  promise or prophecy that are generated by the 
subject matter (e.g., God) and come from its future extension. In this sense, 
the cognitive process always strives for what is not yet historical, i.e., abstract, 
not because it is timeless, but because the future temporal ec-stasy needs to 
become historical in order to arrive at true knowledge. In biblical rationality, 
abstraction in and of  itself  is not the end or aim of  thinking, but a necessity to 
come to a full understanding of  a subject matter. In this sense, the “abstract” 
divine predictions are striving toward their historical fulfillment. Whereas in 
classical thinking that which is abstract cannot become temporal but can only 
analogically find expression in the temporal world, biblical rationality expects 
that which is abstract to become historical. Thus truth is decided at the 
moment the abstract becomes historical, not when it becomes a-historical!
What is tensioned in the cognitive process is what is ontically ex-
tensioned. That which is ex-tensioned in the three ec-stasies of  time and 
that which can be tensioned in present time are, in Canale’s understanding 
of  the biblical interpretation of  the epistemological framework, the lines of  
intelligibility of  the subject matter.55 The lines of  intelligibility flow from the 
temporally extended subject matter. They can deliver information about the 
past (e.g., past actions) or the future (e.g., promises, prophecies) ec-stasies of  
the subject matter. This means that the biblical interpretation of  Reason does 
not assume that the essence of  a subject matter is a brute fact from which 
no lines of  intelligibility flow to the cognitive subject. The cognitive subject 
is therefore not expected to create fully an image of  the brute fact by his 
own hypothetical powers. On the contrary, biblical rationality understands the 
ontic presence of  a subject matter as intellectually graspable, as its meaning 
can be found in the subject matter’s temporal extension that generates lines 
of  intelligibility. 
2.3.4 Summary
We have seen that classical philosophy interprets ultimate reality as timeless, 
whereas the Bible considers reality to be temporal and historical. This 
difference has a major impact on the interpretation of  Reason’s frameworks. 
55Canale, A Criticism of  Theological Reason, 372, n. 2; 378.
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In a timeless conception of  Being, God’s manifestation is consequently of  
nonhistorical quality. Both divine activity and human abstract knowledge 
belong to the realm of  timelessness. Therefore, God’s actions are reduced 
from true temporal reality to mere cognitive awareness (the epistemological 
level according to the classical paradigm).56 Biblical rationality, in contrast, 
views reality as essentially temporal and historical. These crucial differences 
are rooted in different understandings of  God’s ultimate nature. 
The meaning of  YHWH gives us insight into the reasons behind two 
decisions made in the biblical interpretation of  Reason. First, it introduces us 
to the temporal interpretation of  the primordial presupposition and, second, 
it reveals the theo-onto-logical ordo this interpretation is rooted in. These 
two decisions of  biblical rationality imply that ontology cannot precede the 
study of  God.
56Canale, Back to Revelation-Inspiration, 38.
